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The electoral success of the Svoboda Party  
– the consequences for Ukrainian politics 
Tadeusz A. Olszański
The All-Ukrainian Association ‘Svoboda’ scored an unexpected success in the parliamenta-
ry elections, winning support from over 10% of the voters and entering the select group 
of Ukrainian parliamentary parties which operate at a national level. Svoboda’s manifesto is 
nationalist and anti-liberal, in both economic and political aspects. It is in fact the anti-liberal 
component of this party’s manifesto which it can thank for achieving such a big electoral suc-
cess. The faction formed by Svoboda’s 37 representatives in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian par-
liament) will have a small impact on legislative work, but their activity may add further to the 
brutalisation of parliamentary life. Furthermore, Svoboda will attempt to make other opposition 
groupings adopt a more radical approach, which may trigger the disintegration of the United 
Opposition Baktivshchyna. A new wave of public protests is likely to emerge in Ukraine in the 
coming months. Therefore, it can be expected that Svoboda will make efforts to join in or even 
incite them, in order to promote its social and nationalist messages. This may contribute to incre-
asing the popularity of nationalist ideas and to a further radicalisation of sentiments in Ukraine. 
The road to success
The Svoboda Party was established in October 
1991 as the Social-National Party of Ukraine 
(SNPU)1. It has combined radical nationalism 
with radical social slogans since it came into 
existence. The key principles of its ideology inc-
lude unequivocally equating the nation with 
a community which has been formed naturally 
by a single ethnic group , the primacy of the na-
tion’s collective rights over individual human ri-
ghts, the need to build an ‘ethnoeconomy’ and 
the openly racist rhetoric claiming superiority 
of the ‘white race’, etc. 
In 1998, Oleh Tyahnybok, the deputy head of 
the SNPU, who was in charge of organisational 
1 For more on the background and detailed agenda of the 
SNPU-Svoboda, see: Tadeusz A. Olszanski, ‘Svoboda par-
ty – the new phenomenon on the Ukrainian right-wing 
scene’, OSW Commentary, no. 56, 4 July 2011, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_56.pdf 
issues in the party, won a seat in the majori-
ty election to the Verkhovna Rada. When he 
repeated this success in 2002 (the support for 
the SNPU was marginal), he was already strong 
enough to lead the party and significantly redu-
ce the role of neo-Nazi and racist circles within 
it. In February 2004, this party was renamed the 
All-Ukrainian Association Svoboda. However, 
the “large social-nationalist movement” (accor-
ding to the definition in party documents), for-
med by various organisations centred around 
the Social-Nationalist Association established 
in 2008, is still - albeit unofficially - linked to 
it. Yuri Mykhailyshin, who won the election in 
one of the single-member constituencies in Lviv, 
appears to be the person in the party leadership 
responsible for supervising this movement. 
Following these changes, Svoboda began to gain 
strength. It won 0.36% of the votes in the par-
liamentary elections in 2006 (2.16% on average 
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in Eastern Galicia2), and 0.76% in early parlia-
mentary elections in 2007 (3.30% in Galicia). In 
the presidential election in 2010, Tyahnybok was 
backed by 1.4% of the voters (4.71% in Galicia). 
Finally, on average 25.75% of the electorate in 
Eastern Galicia cast their votes for Svodoba in 
municipal elections the same year, and its candi-
dates won the elections in most single-member 
constituencies. In effect, Svoboda formed majo-
rity coalitions in the district councils and gained 
sufficient majority to govern by itself in Lviv, Iva-
nofrankivsk, Ternopil and a number of smaller 
towns. However, it holds real power only in Ter-
nopil, where the mayor is also a representative 
of the party. The recent parliamentary elections 
in these oblasts brought about a further incre-
ase in support for Svoboda, indicating that its 
rule has been rated favourably.
Before the parliamentary elections in 2012, 
Svoboda struck a deal with the United Oppo-
sition Batkivshchyna, as a consequence of which 
the two groupings fielded joint candidates in sin-
gle-member constituencies. As a result, Svobo-
da’s 35 candidates had no competitors in these 
constituencies from – what one may conventio-
nally term – the patriotic camp (this is the sole 
reason why Svoboda was able to win the seat 
in Poltava). In the campaign, the party employ-
ed a rhetoric which was more socially oriented 
than nationalist, together with a catchy slogan 
which proved to be one of the most effective 
of the campaign: “Our power – Our ownership 
– Our dignity on Our Own, God-Sent land” (“na 
SVOiei BOgom DAnoi zemli” in Ukrainian, with 
the emphasised letters spelling out the party’s 
name - “Svoboda”). Svoboda played primarily on 
anti-oligarchic and anti-liberal sentiments, and 
sometimes resorted to populist ideas, such as 
the nationalisation of key companies, imposing 
statutory limits on bank loan interest rates or 
scrapping reform of the pension system. Never-
2 Here and further below in the text, the average result 
from three oblasts is given, without taking into account 
the differences in the number of voters. However, the sup-
port level has been the highest all the time in Lviv Oblast, 
where the population number is the largest. 
theless, the party’s agenda presented during the 
election also included ideas whose implemen-
tation would be beneficial for the country, such 
as the stipulation that all real estate should be 
inventoried or that taxes on small and medium 
companies should be reduced. A significant part 
of these proposals differed minimally from those 
included in the agenda of the Communists, who 
are treated by Svoboda (with full reciprocity) as 
enemies, with whom no compromise is possible. 
According to pre-election polls, Svoboda co-
uld count on 4–5% support in the proportio-
nal elections and between 5 and 8 seats in the 
majority elections. Meanwhile, their real le-
vel of support level turned out to be 10.44% 
(2.13 million votes in comparison to 179,000 
in 2007), which gave them 25 seats in the pro-
portional elections. Its candidates also won 
the elections in 12 single-member constituen-
cies. The degree of support for Svoboda clearly 
grew in all Ukrainian constituencies, and the 
party crossed the 5% electoral threshold in 18 
of the 28 constituencies (including the foreign 
constituency). It is worth noting that support 
for this grouping has grown clearly in the cen-
tral districts and to a lesser but still significant 
extent in the east of the country, although it 
should be taken into account that many resi-
dents of Eastern Galicia have recently moved to 
the large industrial centres in eastern Ukraine. 
Less surprising is Svoboda’s high popularity in 
Kyiv (17.3%), where during the previous elec-
tions its level of support was similar to that in 
Volhynia. According to exit polls, almost half of 
Svoboda played primarily on anti-liberal 
and anti-oligarchic sentiments, and 
sometimes resorted to populist ideas. 
A significant part of these proposals dif-
fered minimally from those included in the 
agenda of the Communists, who are treat-
ed by Svoboda as enemies, with whom no 
compromise is possible.
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Svoboda’s electorate have university degrees 
and live in oblast capital cities (and only one 
quarter of them live in the countryside). The 
age structure of Svoboda’s electorate is well ba-
lanced: there is no overrepresentation of young 
people or pensioners among them. 
The reasons for electoral success
The magnitude of Svoboda’s success seems to 
have taken its leaders by surprise. However, sin-
ce the first hours after the elections, the party 
has been building an image of strength which 
is both constructive (a declared readiness to 
collaborate in the new parliament not only with 
Batkivshchyna but also with Vitalyi Klichko’s 
UDAR party) and radical (the initiation of pro-
tests in front of the Central Electoral Commis-
sion’s office, putting direct pressure on the 
members of the local electoral commissions 
during the vote counting). 
Experts and sociologists agree that this incre-
ased support for Svoboda does not equate to 
a correspondingly large increase in support for 
a radical version of Ukrainian nationalism. A si-
gnificant part of those who cast their votes for 
this party did so in order to express their disil-
lusionment with Batkivshchyna’s policy, espe-
cially its alliance with Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s Front 
for Change, which was viewed with suspicion 
among the national-democratic circles to put it 
mildly. The image of Batkivshchyna as an oppo-
sition party was also tarnished due to the fact 
that it had ruled the country in 2007–2010. Thus 
the voters who were searching for a ‘new force’ 
could choose between Svoboda and UDAR, the 
latter of which was unacceptable to nationalists 
and also to those discouraged by the unclear 
agenda of Klichko’s party. It is conceivable that 
the refusal to agree on candidacies in the key 
single-member constituencies turned out at the 
last moment to be disadvantageous to both 
UDAR and Batkivshchyna.
Some of the public who cast their votes for 
Svoboda saw it not as a nationalist party, but 
as a radically socialist or at least anti-liberal 
one. One of the commentators wrote that “vo-
ters from the south and east of Ukraine voted 
for Svoboda out of hatred towards the Party of 
Regions [thinking] let those Banderites beat the 
faces of the Regionals”3. Other observers highli-
ghted the fact that part of the electorate were 
under the impression that only Svoboda could 
stop the Party of Regions. All these elements 
taken together resulted in success for Svobo-
da, both in its traditional stronghold and in the 
centre and east of the country. 
It seems that the present degree of support for 
Svoboda’s radical nationalism can be estimated 
at 4–5% (within the ranges which pre-election 
polls indicated). However, even this level of sup-
port represents a very serious increase in the 
popularity of their message and proves that 
Svoboda has pushed the traditional western 
Ukrainian nationalist parties out of the political 
arena and taken control of this political ‘niche’. 
Svoboda in Ukrainian politics 
As it has entered the Verkhovna Rada, Svoboda 
will now participate in politics at the national 
level. However, its substantial electoral success 
does not change the fact that it will be unable 
to implement the main tasks on its agenda: the 
reconstruction of Ukraine into an ethnocen-
tric welfare state, banning the propagation of 
3 Vitaliy Skorokhodov, ‘Komu nuzhna „Svoboda”?’, 
13 November 2012 www.from-ua.com/adds/print.php?/
politics/72fc034b03b9b This author represents strong 
anti-Western and pro-Russian views. 
Increased support for Svoboda does not 
equate to a correspondingly large increase 
in support for a radical version of Ukrainian 
nationalism. Some of the public who cast 
their votes for Svoboda saw it as a radical-
ly socialist or at least anti-liberal one.
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Communist ideology (including a ban on the 
Communist Party of Ukraine), large-scale na-
tionalisation, etc. However, it will put forward 
similar projects in parliament for propaganda 
purposes – Svoboda will use the parliamentary 
tribune as an important channel for promulga-
ting its agenda. Svoboda’s representatives in 
parliament will vote against motions brought 
by the Party of Regions, actively oppose them 
in debates and stymie them in commissions (it 
is still not known which commissions its repre-
sentatives will be put in charge of). At the same 
time, Svoboda is likely to spur the radicalisation 
of the Batkivshchyna faction. It will likewise 
strive to push out members of the Front for 
Change, Yatsenyuk in the first order, from the 
Batkivshchyna faction and to put an end to co-
-operation between Batkivshchyna and UDAR 
. Svoboda does not regard UDAR as an oppo-
sition party and is claiming that in the present 
situation “any third force today will be the fi-
fth column tomorrow”4. It is also emphasising 
UDAR’s links with some oligarchs. Such moves 
on the part of Svoboda will be in line with the 
Party of Regions’ desire to weaken the two key 
opposition factions, which does not necessarily 
mean that these will be coordinated. 
Svoboda’s strong faction, consisting predomi-
nantly of young people, may readily be used to 
disrupt parliamentary debates by provoking rows 
and even fights, especially given that the Commu-
nist faction (which has also been rejuvenated) will 
now behave more assertively than during the pre-
vious term. Both of these factions may be used in 
the political game  between the key parliamentary 
parties (the Party of Regions and the United Oppo-
sition). They may also decide to act on their own 
initiative, so as to maintain the image of radical 
and uncompromising forces. The expectation that 
disputes and conflicts in the new Verkhovna Rada 
will become more numerous and more brutal is 
widely shared among Ukrainian commentators. 
4 Statement made by Yuri Mykhailyshin during the elec-
tion campaign. www.mykhalchyshyn.info/diyalnist/po-
diyi/0000343  
However, a more significant consideration is the 
line Svoboda will take in extra-parliamentary 
politics. The deteriorating economic and social 
situation, the anticipated and probably unavo-
idable cuts to existing social benefits, in combi-
nation with hikes in utility bills and the prices of 
basic goods, will in all likelihood provoke a new 
wave of public protests. Though such protests 
may start spontaneously, they will then likely 
attract the support of numerous organisations 
which are themselves weak in terms of organisa-
tion and intellectual potential. Ukraine is lacking 
a strong trade union movement with a clear sen-
se of its objectives. There are also no strong left-
-wing parties that are not involved in collabora-
tion with the government party. In turn, neither 
the United Opposition Batkivshchyna nor UDAR 
are trustworthy enough to mobilise the public 
and hold mass demonstrations. This will open 
up an opportunity for Svoboda to take charge 
of the protests and gain a new voter base in the 
centre and east of the country.
Until recently, support for Svoboda was concen-
trated in Eastern Galicia, and to a lesser extent 
in Volhynia and Kyiv. Now, the situation may 
change significantly. Svoboda, by emphasising 
the leftist and populist elements of its manife-
sto, may reach out to middle-aged and young 
Ukrainians from the centre, east and even so-
uth of the country (with the exception of Cri-
mea). This is particularly true for that segment 
of the Ukrainian public for whom the langu-
age problem is of minor significance and who 
– owing to the moderate, state-centred natio-
Svoboda may reach out to some of middle- 
-aged and young Ukrainians from the 
centre, east and even south of the coun-
try who – owing to the moderate, state- 
-centred nationalism which has been 
promulgated in school for twenty years 
– have ‘unlearned’ the Soviet conception 
of Ukrainian history and identity.
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nalism which has been promulgated in school 
for twenty years – have ‘unlearned’ the Soviet 
conception of Ukrainian history and identity. 
Others can be swayed by anti-immigrant (ra-
cist), anti-gay and pro-family slogans, etc. 
Svoboda will be unable to appeal to the oldest 
generation and those who share a Soviet men-
tality, predominantly immigrants from other 
regions of the former USSR and their descen-
dants. The Communists and UDAR will vie to 
exploit any protests in such circles for their own 
political needs (it is no coincidence that the 
leader of one of the Afghanistan war veteran 
groupings was handed one of the top places on 
UDAR’s party list). It also conceivable that some 
of the protesters from western Ukraine will be 
reluctant to accept political patronage from 
Svoboda – the growing support for Commu-
nists in Eastern Galicia5 is thought-provoking in 
this context. 
This situation may lead to competition between 
the two radicalisms: the nationalist and the po-
st-Soviet (the latter one could be led by Russo-
phile groupings, such as the Fatherland Party 
from Odessa, which are of marginal significan-
ce at present; the Communist Party will also be 
active behind the scenes). Svoboda may use the 
wave of protests to spread Ukrainian national 
consciousness and nationalist ideology, which 
could appeal to those sections of society who 
have a ‘diluted’, unformed national identity. 
5 The support levels for the Communist Party of Ukraine 
were 1.99% as compared to 1.03% in 2007 in Lviv Oblast, 
1.78% versus 0.78% in Ivanofrankivsk Oblast and 1.92% 
versus 0.69% in Ternopil Oblast. Its electorate increased 
much more rapidly in Volhynia: it was at 6.97% versus 
2.72% in Volhynia Oblast, and 6.21% versus 2.40% in 
Rivne Oblast.
It is also worth noting that, unlike with the Par-
ty of Regions and Batkivshchyna, most leading 
politicians in Svoboda are under forty years old 
(Tyahnybok himself is 44 and Mykhailyshin is 
30). Thus, on the one hand, they have no politi-
cal experience, but on the other, they have time 
and do not need to be focused on achieving 
a decisive success in the nearest future. 
Svoboda’s success has provoked a new wave of 
criticism against the party. It is being attacked 
by its opponents (predominantly the Party of 
Regions, the Communists and other left-wing 
parties) as a “Nazi threat” and a puppet in the 
hands of the Party of Regions. Allegations have 
also been made that this party is financed by 
some oligarchs, especially Ihor Kolomoysky, 
a Ukrainian oligarch (and a key activist in the 
Jewish community)6. However, there is no do-
ubt that Svoboda’s success is convenient for the 
Party of Regions, which favoured its election 
campaign with the intention of undermining 
the position of the United Opposition (and, to 
a certain extent, the Communists), and secondly 
to consolidate its own voter base by capitalising 
on the threat of the ‘brown revenge’ (similar 
rhetoric was used against Viktor Yushchenko in 
2004). Similarly, a Tyahnybok campaign for pre-
sidency in 2015, preceded by a strong showing 
from Svoboda’s candidate in Kyiv’s election for 
mayor, might appear beneficial from the point 
of view of the Party of Regions’ tactics (altho-
ugh the notion that he is to be a convenient 
challenger for Yanukovych to face in the presi-
dential runoff seems to be premature). 
This, however, does not mean that the leader-
ship of the Party of Regions or, for example, the 
Presidential Administration controls Svoboda. 
The fact that this party is ready to accept as-
sistance from its enemies is a sign of political 
cynicism and not of a covert deal or subor-
dination. Co-operation with the oligarchs is 
a similar case. Svoboda may accept money from 
6 For example, Vlad Khmurny, ‘Osobennosti natsional-
nykh vyborov. Svolota’, 19 October 2012, www.from-
ua.com/adds/print.php?politics/b6e79deab99c9 and 
Skorokhodov’s text quoted in footnote 3. 
The fact that Svoboda is ready to accept 
assistance from its enemies is a sign of 
political cynicism and not of a covert deal 
or subordination. Co-operation with the 
oligarchs is a similar case.
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anyone, and even make certain undertakings to 
its sponsors7. Still, this does not mean that any 
of the sponsors are capable of controlling the 
party’s activities, at least as long as it maintains 
its idea-centred character. 
Possible developments 
The All-Ukrainian Association Svoboda has be-
come an essential element of the Ukrainian po-
litical scene. It is difficult to expect that it co-
uld easily be marginalised or broken up in the 
coming years. It will continue to play a major 
role in parliamentary life and may even become 
a political patron of public protests, which are 
set to return. The fact that the leaders of this 
party are young will contribute to its building 
a long-term strategy, which will not be restric-
ted to focusing on the closest election. 
Young people, who are willing to actively air 
their views in public, predominate among 
Svoboda’s membership and supporters. Sin-
ce its manifesto implicitly includes consent for 
using violence, one should be wary that distur-
bances during its public pronouncements will 
reoccur (either on their own initiative or in re-
sponse to actions taken by opponents). 
7 It is possible that the protest by its representatives in 
Lviv Oblast council this November against granting 
Chevron a shale gas exploration licence, together with 
demands for granting the licence to a domestic entity, 
was the result of a suggestion from one of its sponsors.
Svoboda’s success is a consequence of the need 
for a radical, populist and anti-liberal agenda 
and organisation, and partly for a radical na-
tionalist agenda, which has been intensifying 
in Ukrainian society. This need also fits in with 
the broader trend of social changes in Europe 
and it can be assumed that this will remain so 
for some time.
The presence of Svoboda in the Verkhovna 
Rada and, more broadly, on the political scene, 
is beneficial for the Party of Regions, because 
it intensifies internal disputes within the oppo-
sition and makes it difficult for the opposition 
to become united (for the  upcoming presiden-
tial election also). It is difficult to expect that 
Svoboda will refrain from putting up its can-
didate in the election and thereby relinquish 
the opportunity to promote its ideas. However, 
this does not mean that it is under the control 
of the Party of Regions (or its putative oligarch 
sponsors). Svoboda is an independent political 
force, with clearly defined goals (albeit not ne-
cessarily with well-planned tactics) and the will 
to pursue them to fulfilment.
Svoboda’s activity will give rise to tension in 
Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Polish rela-
tions, especially in connection with the comme-
moration of the UPA’s victims in Ukraine. Ho-
wever, this will not have any major impact on 
bilateral relations at the state level, since it can 
be assumed that the present Ukrainian gover-
nment will not allow Svoboda to influence its 
foreign policy.
